This article is stated as at 21 November 2026. Culligan is binding Court of Appeal authority, but later cases may refine how it is applied and the capital gains tax rules can be changed by future legislation. Take advice on your own circumstances before acting.
Wells sharing, the division of an illiquid private company asset in specie instead of fixing its cash value, has finally shed its "last resort" label. In Culligan v Rosemin-Culligan [2026] EWCA Civ 948, handed down on 24 July 2026, the Court of Appeal held that there is no principle confining Wells sharing to a last resort or to a minority element of the award, while warning that it is not "standard fare" either. For any Wells sharing divorce case heading to a final hearing in spring 2027, that changes the offers worth making and the questions the single joint expert should be answering now.
What did the Court of Appeal decide in Culligan?
The husband held 46% of SETL Limited. In January 2023 Colendi Holdings Limited acquired SETL by share swap, and he received 12.9 million Colendi shares, about 3.6% of Colendi's capital, held through a nominee. The valuation evidence, which MacDonald J accepted as "a reliable valuation", put the gross value of those shares at £19 million on the basis of a funding round, or about £13.7 million net of tax. The same evidence described the holding as non-marketable, with no current prospect of dividends and a maximum the husband could extract that was "effectively £nil" (paras 22 and 33).
At first instance ([2025] EWFC 1, handed down on 14 January 2025), MacDonald J divided capital equally by value, about £13.7 million each. But 70% of the husband's share was illiquid against 30% of the wife's. Her interest in the Colendi value took the form of a contingent lump sum equal to 30% of that value, secured by a deed of covenant. The Court of Appeal raised it to 50%, saying it could "see no justification for dividing the Colendi shares (or their value) other than equally" (para 91). It also ordered the former home, agreed at £7 million, to be sold with the husband taking 40.4% of the net proceeds "whatever price is in fact achieved" (para 91).
The principle sits at paras 66 and 67 of the judgment. The "last resort" and "minority element" wording came from Mostyn J in WM v HM [2017] EWFC 25, which Lewison LJ quoted in Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 without comment; it was never part of the Court of Appeal's own reasoning. Equally, Wells sharing is not standard fare, given its disadvantages and possible tension with a clean break, and King LJ's warning in Versteegh at [151] that a Wells order "should be approached with caution" still stands. Skeletons citing Versteegh for a last resort rule need rewriting, as do those reading Culligan as making Wells sharing the default.
The wife did not receive Colendi shares. She shares in their value through the contingent lump sum, so the deed of covenant carries much of the practical weight.
Fix, sell or share: structuring a Wells sharing divorce order
The court set out three broad choices at para 68: "(i) 'fix' a value; (ii) order the asset to be sold; and (iii) divide the asset in specie". They can be combined, and "the court could adopt (i) and (iii) in the same case." Risk and illiquidity can be reflected either through Wells sharing or by giving one spouse more than 50% of the assets (para 57). The court must weigh "the nature and quality of the respective assets" (para 55) to reach "a fair balance of risk and illiquidity" (para 56).
Where the spouse is "simply one investor of many", sharing the investment "would not appear inconsistent with effecting a clean break". Where the spouse is "the sole shareholder in a private trading company in which he works", giving the other spouse shares "would clearly be contrary to the clean break" (para 62). And a clean break "must be part of a fair outcome" (para 59). So the evidence needs to establish early which position the shareholder occupies, because that shapes whether in specie sharing, a contingent lump sum or a weighted fixed-value split is realistic. Settling whether a spouse is a passive investor or a working shareholder is part of our matrimonial finance work.
Offers and draft orders need not be all or nothing, since a fixed sum now plus a share of future realisations is squarely within para 68. Where the structure is a contingent lump sum secured by a deed of covenant, the deed should deal with dilution from later funding rounds, information rights, what counts as an exit event, and how tax is deducted before the payment is calculated. And criticism that falls short of the conduct threshold should not reshape the split: the Court of Appeal held that the sale of SETL to Colendi "swap[ped] one illiquid asset for another" and increased the prospect of significant value, and that the judge was wrong to rely on the husband's failure to consult the wife (paras 82 to 84).
Equal by value, unequal by risk: a worked illustration
The Culligan figures show why a 50/50 split by value can still leave risk lopsided. The table takes the net Colendi value of £13.7 million and looks only at each spouse's exposure to those shares, ignoring the house, tax on a later realisation and the deed.
| Exposure to the Colendi shares (England and Wales order, net of tax) | Husband | Wife |
|---|---|---|
| First-instance split (30% contingent lump sum to wife) | about £9.6 million | about £4.1 million |
| Court of Appeal split (50% contingent lump sum to wife) | £6.85 million | £6.85 million |
Under the first-instance order, a collapse in value would have left the husband with about £4.1 million of liquid capital and the wife with about £9.5 million, although both started from roughly £13.7 million on paper. Sharing the value equally puts the downside, and any upside, on both spouses in the same proportion. That is the force of para 88: even a reliable valuation of a private company is "no more than a 'snapshot'", and its future value "is the subject of significant uncertainty", which is why the judge, not the expert, decides how much weight the snapshot bears.
What to ask the single joint expert under FPR Part 25
Culligan does not discuss FPR Part 25 or the single joint expert procedure, but the evidence it relies on has to come through that route. Permission must be sought as soon as possible and no later than the first appointment (r.25.6(d)), and the application must say whether the evidence could come from a single joint expert (r.25.7(2)). PD 25D para 2.1 says that, wherever possible, it should. The letter of instruction is filed and served within 5 business days after the permission hearing, with questions "kept to a manageable number" (PD 25D para 4.1).
A letter that asks only for a value leaves the court short of what Culligan says it needs. Drawing on Peel J's reliability factors in HO v TL [2023] EWFC 215 at [23], which the Court of Appeal pointed to at para 56, we would expect the questions to cover:
- whether the holding is marketable, and whether there is a realistic market for sale;
- how much cash could be extracted now, and the realistic prospect and timing of dividends;
- transfer restrictions, shareholders' agreements, third party interests and the level of control;
- the effect of future funding rounds or dilution;
- the method used (net assets, EBITDA or DCF), the availability of comparables, how niche the business is, and the volatility of the figures and reliability of forecasts;
- which assumptions are seriously in dispute, and how far the value moves if they change.
The expert's duty under r.25.3 is to help the court, and it overrides any obligation to whoever instructs or pays. PD 25B requires an opinion independent of the parties and, where there is a range of opinion, a summary of that range. A report that sets out extractable value, dividend capacity and a range alongside the headline figure gives both sides and the judge the material for the risk-balancing exercise, without the expert straying into what the split should be. Our page on business valuations for litigation and divorce sets out how we approach that.
Written questions afterwards are put once only, within 10 days of service and for clarification only (r.25.10(2)), so the scope has to be right in the letter of instruction.
Funding-round values and the risk of double counting
In Culligan the expert applied no discount to the funding-round price because the investors' price "already had a discount for illiquidity priced in" (para 32). Before arguing for a further discount, or for an unequal split on the ground of illiquidity, check whether the valuation already reflects it, so the same risk is not counted twice.
The reverse mistake is treating a funding-round value as cash. The court accepted the £19 million gross figure as reliable and still heard that the husband could extract nothing from it. If you are weighing up whether to engage a forensic accountant on a start-up holding, that gap between paper value and extractable value is usually the reason to do so.
Capital gains tax if shares are transferred
Where Wells sharing involves an actual transfer of shares, section 58 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, as substituted for disposals on or after 6 April 2023, applies across the UK. Transfers are on a no gain, no loss basis while the couple live together. After separation the same treatment applies to disposals up to the earlier of the last day of the third tax year after the tax year in which they stopped living together and the day the court grants the divorce order. There is no time limit where the disposal is made under an agreement or court order within section 225B(2)(a) or (b). The old rule tied to the tax year of separation no longer applies, so check which limb a proposed transfer falls under before the order is drafted. Our tax advice for separating couples covers the wider position.
Key dates
| Date | What happens (England and Wales unless stated) |
|---|---|
| 6 April 2023 | New TCGA 1992 s.58 rules for separating spouses apply (UK-wide) |
| 24 July 2026 | Culligan v Rosemin-Culligan [2026] EWCA Civ 948 handed down |
| No later than the first appointment | Apply for permission to use expert evidence (FPR r.25.6(d)) |
| Within 10 business days of receiving the list | Raise objections to a proposed single joint expert (PD 25D para 2.2) |
| Within 5 business days after the permission hearing | File and serve the letter of instruction (PD 25D para 4.1) |
| Within 10 days of service of the report | Put written questions, for clarification only (FPR r.25.10(2)) |
Questions solicitors ask
Is Wells sharing still a last resort after Culligan?
No. In Culligan v Rosemin-Culligan [2026] EWCA Civ 948 the Court of Appeal held that there is no principle that Wells sharing is a last resort, or that it should form only a minority element of an award (para 67). But the court also said it is not standard fare, given its disadvantages and possible conflict with a clean break, and should still be approached with caution.
Can my client be forced to share the shares in their own company with their ex-spouse?
The court can divide an asset in specie, but in Culligan the Court of Appeal said that giving shares to the other spouse, where the owner is the sole shareholder in a private trading company in which they work, would clearly be contrary to a clean break. In that situation the alternatives are to share the value, for example through a contingent lump sum or an unequal split of other assets.
Does a recent funding round give a reliable value for start-up shares in a divorce?
It can. In Culligan the court accepted a £19 million gross value based on a funding round as reliable, with no further discount because the investors' price already reflected illiquidity. But the Court of Appeal also called any such valuation no more than a snapshot, and its weight depends on factors such as comparables, the market for sale, volatility and how reliable the forecasts are.
Is there capital gains tax if shares are transferred to a spouse under a divorce order?
For disposals on or after 6 April 2023, section 58 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 treats transfers between separating spouses as no gain, no loss until the earlier of the end of the third tax year after the tax year of separation and the divorce order. Transfers made under a qualifying court order or agreement have no time limit. Check the facts before relying on it.
Who pays the single joint expert's fees in financial remedy proceedings?
Unless the court directs otherwise, the parties are jointly and severally liable for a single joint expert's fees under FPR rule 25.12, and the instructions go in a jointly agreed letter. The court also weighs the cost of expert evidence when deciding whether to give permission, so a focused set of questions on value, liquidity and risk tends to be easier to justify.
Speak to us. To discuss an instruction or a case, Contact Jack Ross or call us on 0161 832 4451.
Sources
- Culligan v Rosemin-Culligan [2026] EWCA Civ 948
- D Culligan v A Culligan (Wells Sharing) [2025] EWFC 1
- HO v TL [2023] EWFC 215
- Culligan (Appellant) v Rosemin-Culligan (Respondent): live hearing
- Family Procedure Rules Part 25: Experts and Assessors
- Practice Direction 25B: The Duties of an Expert, the Expert's Report and Arrangements for an Expert to Attend Court
- Practice Direction 25D: Financial remedy proceedings and other family proceedings (except children proceedings): the use of single joint experts
- Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, section 58